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ABSTRACT
Both the SSS and SOBER-t32 stream cipher designs use a
single word-based shift register and a nonlinear filter func-
tion to produce keystream. In this paper we show that the
algebraic attack method previously applied to SOBER-t32
is prevented from succeeding on SSS by the use of the key-
dependent substitution box (SBox) in the nonlinear filter of
SSS. Additional assumptions and modifications to the SSS
cipher in an attempt to enable algebraic analysis result in
other difficulties that also render the algebraic attack infea-
sible. Based on these results, we conclude that a well-chosen
key-dependent substitution box used in the nonlinear filter
of the stream cipher provides resistance against such alge-
braic attacks.
Keywords
Algebraic Attack, Stream Ciphers, SSS, eSTREAM, Multi-
variate Equations.
1. INTRODUCTION
SSS [11] and SOBER-t32 [12] are two designs from the SOBER
family of stream ciphers [13]. Each cipher design is based
on a single 17-stage word-based shift register, and uses a
nonlinear filter function (NLF) to generate the keystream
outputs. In both cases the word-based NLF makes use of a
Substitution Box (SBox), and both modular and binary ad-
dition (XOR) are performed over the word size. Although
the structures are similar, there are some important dif-
ferences between these two designs. SOBER-t32 is a syn-
chronous stream cipher that uses 32-bit words, a 256-bit
key (8 words) and a linear feedback function for the shift
register. SSS is a self-synchronous stream cipher that uses
16-bit words, a 128-bit key (also 8 words) and a nonlinear
feedback function for the shift register. Although both de-
signs apply a nonlinear filter to stages of the shift register
in producing keystream, there are differences in the compo-
nents of this function. For SOBER-t32, the SBox used is
fixed, and it is applied once in the NLF, whereas the SBox
used for SSS is key-dependent, and it is used twice in the
NLF. A final difference is that for SOBER-t32, the output
of the NLF is stuttered before it is used as a keystream. For
SSS the output of NLF is used directly as the keystream.
Besides keystream generation, SSS is also used to generate
a 128-bit Message Authentication Code (MAC), although
this functionality is not explored in this paper.
The SOBER-t32 cipher, with the stuttering function re-
moved, has been attacked using an algebraic attack to re-
cover the initial states of the shift register [3]. The basic
idea of this attack is to develop a set of equations for the
NLF of SOBER-t32 that relate the inputs to the NLF (taken
from the shift register stages) with the keystream outputs.
For a known keystream segment, solving the set of equations
permits the recovery of the initial state of the shift register.
Previously, the SSS cipher was analysed using a chosen-
ciphertext attack [9] to recover the secret key. Self-synchronous
ciphers are vulnerable to this style of attack, as the attacker
has control over some inputs to the keystream generator.
The attack presented in [9] uses less than 10 kB of a single
chosen-ciphertext stream to recover the contents of the key-
dependent SBox, taking on average ten seconds to perform
using a PC. The authors of the attack claim that this attack
is practical, and the time and keystream requirements for
their simulated attacks support that statement. However,
the SSS specification [11] states that the cipher designers
assume that the result of decrypting altered ciphertext will
not be made available to the attacker, since then the attacker
has complete control over the state of the cipher through the
self-synchronising mechanism. Hence, the existing attack
may be considered successful only if it is possible to access
the cipher in a way prohibited by the cipher designers.
In this paper, we investigate the application of a different
type of attack to SSS; one that does not require chosen-
ciphertext. As the algebraic attack on SOBER-t32 without
stuttering [3] was successful, and the two ciphers have sim-
ilar designs (and SSS does not employ stuttering), we have
attempted to modify the SOBER-t32 attack and apply it to
SSS.
The outline of this paper is as follows. Section 2 gives a brief
description of the keystream generators for SOBER-t32 and
SSS. An outline of the algebraic attack method is provided
in Section 3. Section 4 shows how we applied an algebraic
attack to SSS. Section 5 discusses the results obtained and
presents some concluding remarks regarding the security of
nonlinearly filtered keystream generators against algebraic
attacks.
2. DESCRIPTION OF KEYSTREAM GEN-
ERATORS
2.1 Notation
The following notation will be used throughout this paper:
• ⊕: Exclusive OR.
• (≫ b): Rotation right by b bit positions.
• +: Addition modulo the word size:(232) or (216) for
SOBER-t32 or SSS respectively.
• W t: word at time t.
• W ti : The i-th bit of word W at time t.
• S[i]tj and R[i]tj : The j-th bit position of register stage
i at time t.
• S[i]tj→k and R[i]tj→k: A consecutive bit stream from
the j-th to k-th bits of stage i at time t.
This notation may be applied to other symbols. For example
we use P t , Zt and Ct to represent the plaintext, keystream
and ciphertext words respectively at time t.
2.2 Description of SOBER-t32 keystream gen-
erator
The SOBER-t32 keystream generator consists of a 17-stage
Linear Feedback Shift Register (LFSR) and a nonlinear fil-
ter function (NLF) as shown in Figure 1. Each register stage
S[0], . . . , S[16], contains a 32-bit word. Thus, the total in-
ternal state size is 544 bits.
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Figure 1: SOBER-t32 keystream generator
The state update function for the LFSR is as follows:
S[i]t+1 =
{
S[i+ 1]t, for i = 0, . . . , 15,
S[15]t ⊕ S[4]t ⊕ δ · S[0]t, for i = 16.
where δ = 0xc2db2aa3 and · represents multiplication over
GF (232).
The output function for SOBER-t32 is performed in two
stages. Firstly, the intermediate value V t is obtained as a
nonlinear combination of the contents of five stages of the
LFSR and the key-dependent constant K. The value of the
constant K, is determined during the initialization of the
LFSR and is retained for the entire session. As shown in
Figure 1, V t is given by the following equation:
V t = ((g(S[0]t + S[16]t) + S[1]t + S[6]t)⊕K) + S[13]t
The function g uses a fixed SBox with an 8-bit input and
32-bit output. We let D denote the input to the function
g, DH denote the 8 most significant bits and DL denote the
24 least significant bits. In [12] the role of the SBox in g is
given by:
g(D) = SBox(DH)⊕ (0||DL) (1)
If we expand the function g using the expression in equation
1, we obtain an equivalent structure for the NLF, as shown
in Figure 2.
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Figure 2: NLF of SOBER-t32
The second stage of the output function is irregular decima-
tion of the output of the NLF. (In [12], this is referred to
as stuttering). The sequence of keystream words Zt is the
irregular decimation of the sequence of words V t. This is
intended to make correlation attacks infeasible. The cipher-
text word Ct at time t is generated by XORing the generated
keystream word Zt with the plaintext word P t as shown in
Figure 1. The algebraic attack is applied to SOBER-t32
with the stuttering mechanism removed. Therefore, we do
not elaborate on this operation here. For stuttering details,
the reader is referred to the SOBER-t32 specification [12].
2.3 Description of SSS keystream generator
The SSS keystream generator consists of a 17-stage shift
register and a NLF as shown in Figure 3. Each register
stage R[0], . . . , R[16], contains a 16-bit word. Thus, the total
internal state size is 272 bits.
The state update function for the shift register is given as
follows:
R[i]
t+1
=

Ct for i = 16
R[15]t + f(ct≫ 8) for i = 14
f(R[13]t) for i = 12
(R[2]t≫ 8) for i = 1
R[i+ 1]t for i = 0, 2, . . . , 11, 13, 15.
The keystream word Zt is obtained as a nonlinear combi-
nation of the contents of five stages of the shift register as
shown in Figure 3, and given by following equation:
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Figure 3: SSS keystream generator
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An important component of SSS is the nonlinear function
f . The function f makes use of a key-dependent SBox which
has an 8-bit input and a 16-bit output. Similar to SOBER-
t32, we consider the 16 bit intermediate word X as the con-
catenation of the two eight bit words, XH and XL. In [11]
the role of the SBox in f is given by
f(X) = SBox(XH)⊕X (2)
If we expand the function f using the expression in equation
2, we obtain an equivalent structure for the NLF, as shown
in Figure 4.
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Figure 4: Non-Linear Filter (NLF) of SSS
The ciphertext word Ct at time t is formed by XORing the
generated keystream word Zt with the plaintext word P t .
As SSS is a self-synchronous stream cipher, the ciphertext
word Ct is fed back to the stages of shift register as shown
in Figure 3.
3. OUTLINE OF ALGEBRAIC ATTACKS
Algebraic attacks on symmetric ciphers were applied first
to block ciphers in 2002 [8] and then to stream ciphers in
2003 [7]. Algebraic attacks on stream ciphers work by find-
ing equations describing relations between the secret key or
the internal state and the output keystream. There are two
main steps in performing algebraic attacks. The first step
is to find valid relationships between the internal state bits
or the key bits and the keystream output bits. These are
expressed as a set of equations. The second step is to solve
this system of equations efficiently. For ease of analysis,
algebraic attacks are often performed by describing the ci-
pher state and keystream in terms of bit values, regardless
of whether the cipher is bit-based or word-based. At the
bit level, the cipher functions are described in terms of the
XOR and AND bit operations (addition and multiplication
over GF(2) respectively).
The relationships between initial state bits or key bits and
known keystream output bits can be obtained directly or
indirectly for the nonlinear components that generate the
keystream output. Direct relationships are obtained by build-
ing mathematical models of the nonlinear components, where
the output bits are presented as functions of the input bits.
Indirect relationships are obtained by considering the input
and output bits of the nonlinear components together and
finding valid relationships among them. In either case, the
output of this first step is a system of multivariate equations
of a certain degree.
In order to simplify solving the system of equations, a pre-
fix operation can be applied before beginning step two. The
aim of this operation is to reduce the degree of the equations.
This can be achieved by finding low degree multiples of the
output nonlinear function that generates the keystream. Al-
ternatively, relabelling can be used where tradeoffs are made
between the number of variables and the degree of the equa-
tions. Also, guessing some key or state bits that occur in
many high degree terms could reduce the degree of the equa-
tions, but at the same time, it may increase the total com-
plexity of the attack. Once the system of equations is pre-
pared, an attempt is made to find a solution. The output
of this step is the recovery of the unknowns, namely the key
bits or the initial state bits of the register.
There are several approaches to solving the system of nonlin-
ear equations. One method is known as linearization. This
involves replacing each high degree term in an equation with
a single term, and the introduction of these new variables
enables the equation system to be translated to a linear sys-
tem. Another method is to use Gro¨bner bases [10]. The idea
behind this method is to transform the set F of polynomials
that describe the problem into another set G of polynomi-
als with certain properties such that F and G generate the
same output but with low degree in function G. Another
approach to solve the nonlinear equation system is the XL
algorithm [4].
Let T be the number of monomials in the system of n vari-
ables with maximum degree d, then T is given by the fol-
lowing equation:
T =
d∑
i=0
(
n
i
)
A practical algorithm to solve this system is Strassen’s al-
gorithm [14] . This algorithm requires about 7 · T log27 op-
erations. As we are working over GF(2), the processor of a
modern CPU can handle 64 such operations at each cycle.
Thus, the total complexity C using this algorithm will be:
C = (7/64) · T log27
4. APPLYING THE ALGEBRAIC ATTACK
TO SSS
In this section, we modify the algebraic attack applied to
SOBER-t32 [3], and attempt to apply it to SSS. We con-
sider a word as 16 individual bits and we start by building
multivariate equations for the NLF. These equations relate
the contents of the shift register stages with the keystream
output.
4.1 Constructingmultivariate equations for NLF
The NLF of SSS at time t takes input words from five stages
of the shift register to generate one word of keystream Zt as
shown in Figure 4. The relation between the words of the
shift register stages R[0] , R[16] and the intermediate word
X can be described at time t with the following equation:
Xt = R[0]t +R[16]t
The first two bits of X, namely X0 and X1, can be obtained
from the following equations which use binary addition mod-
ulo 2 (exclusive OR) instead of integer addition:
Xt0 = R[0]
t
0 ⊕R[16]t0
Xt1 = R[0]
t
1 ⊕R[16]t1 ⊕R[0]t0R[16]t0
Taking a similar approach, we can determine relations among
the SBox outputs α and β, the keystream output Z, and sev-
eral register states, as follows:
Zt8 = X
t
0 ⊕R[1]t0 ⊕R[6]t0 ⊕R[13]t0 ⊕ βt8 ⊕R[0]t8 ⊕ αt0
Zt9 = X
t
1 ⊕R[1]t1 ⊕R[6]t1 ⊕R[13]t1 ⊕ βt9 ⊕R[0]t9 ⊕ αt1⊕
(αt0 ⊕Xt0)(R[1]t0 ⊕R[6]t0 ⊕R[13]t0)⊕
R[1]t0(R[6]
t
0 ⊕R[13]t0)⊕R[6]t0R[13]t0 (3)
Alternatively we can build other relations as follows. If we
look into the first modular addition X = R[0] + R[16], we
can divide this addition into two separate additions. The
first addition is the addition of the least significant byte
which is the addition between bits 0 → 7 of stages R[0]
and R[16]. The second addition is the most significant byte
which is used as an input to the SBox. In the second addition
there will be a carry s at the 8-th position from the previous
addition and this carry should be considered in this addition
process. So the two additions can be described as follows:
X0→7 = (R[0]0→7 +R[16]0→7) mod 2
8
X8→15 = (R[0]8→15 +R[16]8→15 + s) mod 2
8
4.2 Constructing the SSS combiner
The NLF of SSS is too complex for the output keystream to
be modeled directly as functions of register states. However,
indirect relationships may be computed in a similar manner
to the algebraic attack on SOBER-t32 by treating the NLF
as a combiner with memory. The combiner for SSS is shown
in Figure 5. It can be observed that it is not possible to
determine α0, α1 given the inputs, since the SBox is key-
dependent. Therefore, this combiner cannot be used to find
valid relations for SSS.
Following the discussion from [6] for key-dependent combin-
ers, the unknown output bits from using the key-dependent
SBox
α0α1α (16 bits)
R[16]8→15R[0]8→15
s(1-bit)
Figure 5: Combiner structure of SSS
SBox twice can be treated as memory bits in the combiner.
This means that these unknown bits would not appear in
the relations obtained from the combiner.
We extend the combiner to cover the entire NLF, where
the output is the keystream bit Z8, described in equation
3. Let α and β represent the intermediate values which are
the output of the first use of SBox and second use of SBox
respectively. The Z8 keystream bit depends on β8, R[0]8,
R[13]0, R[6]0, R[1]0, α0, R[0]0 and R[16]0. As mentioned
before, we treat bits of α and β as memory bits. In total
there would be 6 bits of input, one bit output, and 2 memory
bits. This combiner is shown in Figure 6.
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Figure 6: Possible valid combiner structure for NLF
of SSS
If we construct the matrix M for this combiner, it is neces-
sary to have 28 rows in M to cover all possibilities of the in-
put bits and memory bit. On the other hand, there are only
7 variables from the input and the output for the columns.
To guarantee a valid relation between the inputs and out-
puts, we require that
k∑
i=0
(
7
i
)
> 28
This inequality cannot be satisfied, since the maximum value
for the binomial sum is 27. This means that valid relations
cannot be guaranteed, since there would be always more
rows then columns in the matrix M . Nevertheless, it may be
possible to still find valid relations if the rank of M happens
to be lower than the number of columns, but this occurs
with a very low probability.
Since the matrixM is of a practical size, we have constructed
M using Magma 2.12 [2] . All possible monomials up to
the maximum degree 7 are used, giving 27 columns, which
is the highest possible for the 7 bits of chosen inputs and
outputs in the combiner. It has been found that M has
rank 27, which means that it has trivial nullspace, and so
no linear dependencies among the columns. Therefore, it is
not possible to obtain a valid relation for this combiner.
4.3 Conditional analysis of SSS
From Section 4.2, it is clear that a valid relation cannot be
obtained by the combiner method. However, suppose that
another method could be used to find these relations for
this specific NLF. Such a method may not be systematic
and may be difficult to discover, and we leave it as an open
problem. However, we continue our analysis of SSS for the
sake of completeness of the analysis under the assumption
that a method for forming these relations exists.
4.3.1 Algebraic analysis assuming valid relations ex-
ist
Assume that a valid relation can actually be found for the
NLF among the register states and the output keystream us-
ing an alternative method, despite the difficulties discussed
previously. This means there is an equation
F (R[0]0, R[16]0, . . . , Z8) = 0
of maximum degree k in 7 variables that is valid for all possi-
ble register inputs and keystream outputs. In the worst case
we have k = 7. The relation can then be used to generate a
system of equations by evaluating the relation for a series of
time steps. Under a known plaintext scenario, the keystream
bits Ztj are assumed to be known at all times t, and these
values can be substituted into the relevant equations.
If the underlying register is linear, as it is in the case of
SOBER-t32, the register state bits R[i]j would be linear
combinations of the initial state bits of the shift register.
These linear combinations of initial state bits can simply be
substituted into the equations relating the register contents
to the keystream. Clocking the register does not increase
the degree of the equations relating the contents of the reg-
ister stages to the initial values, they remain linear. The
resulting equation system would have variables representing
all bits of the initial states of the shift register, and it would
be of maximum degree k ≤ 7, since all substitutions made
have been linear. Solving the system means recovering these
initial states.
In the case of SSS, some stages of the shift register are up-
dated nonlinearly, so it is not possible to use only linear
combinations of the initial values of the register states to
express the contents of the register stages at later times.
Furthermore, the updated register contents contain values
obtained from the key-dependent SBox, so it is not possible
to determine the register states for successive clocks without
knowledge of either the key or the SBox or without introduc-
ing an excessive number of new variables. This prevents us
from generating a set of equations from the relations found
for the NLF, and the algebraic attack fails.
4.3.2 Algebraic analysis of modified SSS
We consider the application of the algebraic attack outlined
in Sections 4.2 to a modified version of SSS, where the shift
register is updated linearly using a slightly modified ver-
sion of the feedback function taken from the shift register
in SOBER-t16, so that the cipher remains self-synchronous.
The modification consists of XORing the ciphertext word
with the feedback word from the shift register in updating
the register contents, as shown in Figure 7.
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Figure 7: Modified structure of SSS keystream gen-
erator
For this modified version of SSS, we attempt to develop a
system of equations for use in an algebraic attack. Since
the register states are updated linearly, each state at time t
can be represented as linear expressions in the initial states
variables. Therefore, the system has maximum degree k ≤ 7.
Solving this system of equation permits the recovery of the
initial states of the shift register. In the worst case, the
equations are of degree up to 7 as mentioned in Section
4.2. We have 272 unknowns in this system representing the
initial state of the 16 bits in each of the 17 stages of the shift
register. This system can be solved by the XL algorithm [5].
The number of monomials T in this system is given by:
T=
7∑
i=0
(
272
i
)
≈ 244
Therefore, we would need to generate at least T equations
for all initial states to be recovered. We would also need
244 observations of Z8 from a single key, which would be ob-
tained from at least 244 keystream words generated from the
key. This keystream requirement falls within the maximum
of 280 words of keystream output allowed for a single key IV
pair in the SSS specification. The complexity of this attack
using the XL algorithm would be:
(7/64) · T log27 ≈ 2121
Note that the complexity of this algebraic attack on the
modified SSS is less than the complexity for exhaustive key
search of SSS, which costs 2128. This shows that modifying
the register so that the feedback function is linear, does allow
the algebraic attack to be launched, under the condition that
a method for forming valid relations for the NLF can be
found.
5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The algebraic attack on SOBER-t32 viewed the NLF as a
combiner with two output bits (α0 and α1) and only one
memory bit (the carry bit). The matrix constructed for
this combiner had a greater number of columns than the
number of rows, so there exists a multivariate equation that
relates the input and the output of the combiner without
the memory bit.
As the SSS cipher has a similar structure, we view the NLF
of SSS as a combiner. However, the combiner constructed
for the NLF of SSS has a greater number of memory bits
than output bits. This is due to the fact that the SBox
is key-dependent and is used twice in the NLF of SSS. As
shown in Section 4.2, to construct a combiner for one bit
of keystream output from the NLF, we require two memory
bits. If we include more output bits in the combiner, we
also have to include more memory bits that correspond to
the output bits (the number of memory bits is twice the
number of output bits). Therefore, when constructing a
matrix for this combiner, there will always be more rows
than columns. This means that linear dependencies cannot
be guaranteed, so finding a valid relation for the NLF using
this matrix method is unlikely. For a combiner with one bit
of output, we showed that it is not possible to obtain a valid
relation because the matrix is of full rank.
This result supports the claim by the SSS authors in their eS-
TREAM submission document [11] that SSS is secure from
algebraic attack. The use of a key-dependent SBox results in
the relations describing the NLF being unknown, which pre-
vents valid relations being found among the register states
and the keystream outputs using the combiner method. The
situation is further compounded by the fact that the SBox is
used twice in the NLF, which doubles the number of mem-
ory bits needed for the combiner. This renders a successful
algebraic attack on SSS using this strategy very improbable,
if not infeasible.
Our conditional analysis shows that the use of a nonlinear
shift register update function also contributes to the resis-
tance of SSS to algebraic attacks. Even if valid relations of
low degree could be found for the NLF, the degree of such
equations will sharply increase during the equation genera-
tion stage. Finally, we considered a modified version of SSS
such that the shift register state update function is linear.
We show that this makes solving the resulting system of
equations feasible. This algebraic method can be launched
successfully on SSS if both a valid equation can be formed
for NLF and the updated function for state is linear. In such
a case we estimate the complexity of the attack to be 2121
operations and require 244 keystream bits.
In conclusion, using a key-dependent SBox in the NLF con-
tributes to the resistance of SSS against algebraic attack
using the combiner method. The use of a nonlinear update
function (which also makes use of the key-dependent SBox
for the shift register) also increases the resistance against
this type of attack. This research indicates that the use
of a key-dependent SBox may be a worthwhile strategy in
designing secure keystream generators for stream ciphers.
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